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Legal Transitions: Some                     
Welfarist Remarks 
MATTHEW D. ADLER* 
In his remarkable 1986 article, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Transitions,1 Louis Kaplow built upon earlier and pathbreaking work by 
Michael Graetz2 and overturned the then-conventional wisdom about 
legal transitions.  Where the rule change itself is desirable, Kaplow argued, 
transition relief would generally be undesirable and indeed the fully 
retroactive application of the rule might be warranted.  Kaplow’s central 
points were twofold: transition relief dampened desirable ex ante incentives, 
for actors, to anticipate desirable legal change; and absent market failures 
the risk of uncompensated transitions would be optimally mitigated through 
insurance markets, obviating the need for governmental relief.3 
Kaplow qualified his claims in various ways,4 and further qualifications 
have emerged in the law-and-economics literature on transitions spawned 
by Kaplow and Graetz (most recently Daniel Shaviro’s magisterial book).5  
Given failures in the insurance market, such as adverse-selection problems 
or administrative costs, government-provided transition insurance or even 
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compensation might be justified.6  Given public-choice type failures in 
the formulation of legal rules, a transition policy of no relief or full 
retroactivity might slow the emergence of desirable rules.7  Even 
bracketing such market or governmental failures, the incentive argument 
for retroactivity might need to be narrowed, for example to account for 
legal rules that function like governmental contracts,8 or to distinguish 
between true “policy changes” and mere “accounting changes.”9 
In this paper, I intend to reassess the Kaplow claim in a different way—
by taking a standpoint outside law and economics but sympathetic to its 
most basic normative premise, namely welfarist consequentialism.  One 
might attack the claim by adducing the nonwelfarist, nonconsequentialist 
“fairness” considerations that Kaplow discounted in Economic Analysis of 
Legal Transitions10 and has rejected more systematically in recent work 
with Shavell.11  I will not do that in my paper, because my own 
sympathies are consequentialist and, if not strictly welfarist, then close 
enough in the sense that I take overall well-being to be one of several 
genuine, foundational moral criteria12 and, further, agree with Richard 
Arneson that welfare is the currency of distributive justice.13  Rather, I will 
assume—with the economists—that welfarism is indeed the governing 
moral framework for evaluating transition policy (and everything else!), 
and consider some foundational philosophical issues within welfarism, 
relevant to the transition analysis, that as far as I’m aware have been little 
discussed in the economics literature. 
More concretely, I will imagine a welfarist social planner at some 
initial time T0, crafting a transition rule for some area of the law—a 
transition rule that will be applied going forward.  For reasons to be 
mentioned in a moment, if the social planner really is welfarist in the 
relatively strict sense assumed to be morally appropriate by Kaplow and 
Shavell and by many others within normative economics, then this 
Planner is best seen as utilitarian.  For simplicity (and because I know 
nothing about tax law), this concrete example will involve not tax 
 
 6. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 536–50. 
 7. See, e.g., Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 5. 
 8. See Logue, supra note 5. 
 9. See SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 53–63. 
 10. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 522–27, 576–81. 
 11. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). 
 12. See Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory 
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retroactivity but the simpler case of retroactivity with respect to regulatory 
directives issued by an administrative agency that (I will assume) the 
Planner with certainty controls.  By “regulatory directives,” I mean 
directives that create legal obligations for firms or private individuals 
and are backed by penalties, for simplicity civil fines.  Anti-pollution 
directives, or directives not to sell certain kinds of products, would be 
good examples.  For simplicity, I will assume that the menu of transition-
policy options is limited to two: simple prospectivity (a new directive is 
applied only to behavior occurring after the enactment of the directive) 
and simple retroactivity (a new directive is not only applied to post-
enactment behavior, but in addition individuals who previously engaged 
in behavior impermissible under the new directive are fined, and 
individuals previously fined for behavior permissible under the new 
directive are paid rebates for fines they incurred).  Note that the Planner 
anticipates she will control the agency in the future, and because (by 
assumption) she knows herself to be utilitarian, my example is one in 
which otherwise-desirable transition policy ought not be rejected 
because it would interfere with desirable change.  So this example—at 
least in that respect—presents a particularly strong case for retroactivity.  
But that case may weaken once one probes the foundations of welfarism 
a bit more. 
I. QUASI-WELFARISM, WEAK WELFARISM, PARETIAN                  
WELFARISM, UTILITARIANISM 
Quasi-welfarism, weak welfarism, Paretian welfarism, and utilitarianism 
are increasingly restricted variants of consequentialism14—increasingly 
restricted in the sense that each entry on this list is implied by the next 
but does not imply it. Weak welfarism is the simplest view: it say that 
goodness “supervenes” on welfare, that two outcomes (possible worlds) 
such that each person’s welfare level in one outcome equals her welfare 
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level in the other must be equally good.15  Paretian welfarism adds the 
requirement that the outcome in which at least one person’s welfare is 
higher, and no one’s is lower, must be better.  To see the difference here 
from weak welfarism, note that a tough-minded egalitarian view that 
requires the “leveling down” of the welfare of the rich to increase 
welfare-equality is consistent with weak welfarism but not Paretian 
welfarism. Utilitarianism ignores distributive considerations: the goodness 
comparison of two worlds depends solely on the sum of welfare 
differences, for all affected individuals, between the two worlds.  So, for 
example, the “prioritarian” proposal advanced by some philosophers and 
countenanced by many economists—that greater weight should be given 
to the welfare of those who are worse off—is consistent with Paretian 
welfarism but not utilitarianism.16  Finally, quasi-welfarism gives a 
central role to welfare (“central role” of course is a vague criterion) but 
need not respect the supervenience requirement.  The quasi-welfarist might 
give different goodness rankings to worlds where everyone’s welfare is 
equal as between the worlds. 
Kaplow and Shavell, consistent with (what I take to be) the consensus 
among economists and indeed the state of the art within welfare economics, 
are Paretian welfarists but not utilitarians.17  Shaviro is a utilitarian.18  
Which is the right approach for a welfarist?  I think Shaviro’s is.  Weak 
 
 15. “Weak welfarism” is normally called, simply, “welfarism”.  See Andrew Moore 
& Roger Crisp, Welfarism in Moral Theory, 74 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 598 (1996).  I have 
added “weak” to emphasize that a view attributing moral significance to welfare, and 
only welfare, need not incorporate the Pareto principle, let alone reduce to utilitarianism. 
The supervenience principle, as stated in the text, is too simple because it ignores the 
problem of incomparability.  A better statement might be: One outcome cannot be better 
or worse than another (it must be either equally good or incomparably good) unless one 
person’s welfare is better or worse. 
 16. On the difference between prioritarianism and a strict egalitarian view that would 
require “leveling down,” see Dennis McKerlie, Equality and Priority, 6 UTILITAS 25 
(1994); Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY 81–125 (Matthew 
Clayton & Andrew William eds., 2000); Larry Temkin, Equality, Priority, and the Leveling 
Down Objection, in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY 126–61 (Matthew Clayton & Andrew William 
eds., 2000). 
 17. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 11, at 15–38.  As they crisply state: 
“Under the rubric of welfare economics, the conception of social welfare is based on 
individuals’ well-being. Specifically, social welfare is postulated to be an increasing 
function of individuals’ well-being and to depend on no other factors.” Id. at 24.  See 
generally ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 139 (1984). 
It has been pointed out to me that Kaplow, in other work, has adopted a utilitarian 
rather than Paretian welfarist framework. My characterization of Kaplow’s general moral 
view is based on FAIRNESS AND WELFARE, his most thorough (and quite recent) defense 
of a general view, and not his entire scholarly corpus. 
 18. See SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 16–19. 
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welfarism and Paretian welfarism are unstable approaches: unstable not in 
the sense that they’re conceptually incoherent, but in the sense that the 
considerations which count in their favor (as against utilitarianism) tend to 
push all the way to quasi-welfarism.  Those considerations are, again, 
distributive.  But, as Dworkin brilliantly argued in his work on equality, and 
as others have elaborated, it is deeply counterintuitive to think that 
distributive norms would ignore the relevant persons’ responsibility for 
their welfare levels.19  An outcome in which P1 has a substantially lower 
welfare level than P2, through no fault of his own, is worse (qua fair 
distribution) than an outcome in which P1’s welfare is lower than P2’s as a 
result of P1’s own imprudent decisions. 
What does this mean for the analysis of transition policy?  It means 
that we should conserve analytic resources by ignoring the less plausible 
moral frameworks (weak welfarism and Paretian welfarism) and focus 
on the more plausible ones (quasi-welfarism and utilitarianism).  And if our 
welfarism is axiomatic, then utilitarianism follows.  Nonretroactivity 
has, in the past, been defended with reference to distributive considerations: 
the “horizontal equity” argument for prospectivity might, for example, 
be understood as a distributive argument.20  Whatever the persuasiveness 
of this argument for the weak or Paretian welfarist, it will be ignored by 
the utilitarian. 
Which is not to say that a quasi-welfarist who cares about the distribution 
of welfare and injects responsibility into the mix will be persuaded by 
the “horizontal equity” argument.  That quasi-welfarist should care—I 
tend to think—about the fair distribution of lifetime welfare.21  Imagine 
that person P1 is retroactively sanctioned through no fault of his own, 
while P2 is not.  This difference might be counterbalanced by some gain 
that P1 but not P2 reaps in another domain, at another time.  Given that 
possibility and the concern for lifetime, not temporally or situationally 
narrower equality, the best redistributive institutions might be much 
more synoptic than transition policy.  As Kaplow puts it: “[S]eeking 
equality in each instance and seeking equality overall are not necessarily 
equivalent . . . . [C]onsistent pursuit of the former will often accomplish 
 
 19. See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981). The literature generated by Dworkin’s article is reviewed 
by Barbara Fried’s contribution to this symposium.  For a recent contribution to that 
literature, see CHRISTOPHER LAKE, EQUALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY (2001). 
 20. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 17–19. 
 21. See Adler, supra note 14, at 1324–25.  Cf. LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 
232–44 (1993). 
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the latter in an inefficient manner.”22  But even if nonretroactivity is part 
of the optimal legal regime given distributive considerations, i.e., within 
quasi-welfarism, that point is irrelevant for the utilitarian. 
II. WHAT IS WELFARE? PREFERENTIALIST AND SUBSTANTIVE VIEWS 
Utilitarianism is really a family of moral views, not a fully specified 
view.  The utilitarian enjoins actors to promote good outcomes and 
equates goodness with overall well-being.  But, for example, the concept 
of welfare can plausibly be specified in different ways,23 and these 
different specifications give rise to different variants of utilitarianism.  A 
welfare view answers the following question: Under what conditions is 
some person P better off in one outcome O1 as compared to another O2?  
The set of plausible answers to that question can be divided up in a 
number of ways; for my purposes here, the best division is a binary 
division between preferentialist and substantive welfare views.  
Preferentialist views require that P prefer O1, in some sense, to be better 
off in that world, but do not require that O1 be objectively better for P.  
Substantive views build in objective improvement as a necessary if 
perhaps not sufficient condition for a welfare improvement.  By 
“objectively better” I mean something like this: O1 is objectively better 
for P than O2 iff everyone, under idealized conditions, would prefer to be 
P in O1 as opposed to being P in O2.
24  Here are some examples of 
preferentialist views: 
 P is better off in O1 than O2 iff he actually prefers O1 to O2. 
 P is better off in O1 than O2 iff he ideally (under full 
information, say) prefers O1 to O2. 
 P is better off in O1 than O2 iff he actually prefers O1 to O2 
and this preference is self interested (in some sense that 
does not appeal to objective improvement). 
 
 22. Kaplow, supra note 1, at 579–80. 
 23. Good overviews of the philosophical literature on well-being include: JAMES 
GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 7–72 
(1986); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493–502 (1984); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT 
WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 108–43 (1998); L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS AND 
ETHICS 45–137 (1996); Mozaffar Qizilbash, The Concept of Well-Being, 14 ECONOMICS 
AND PHILOSOPHY 51 (1998). 
 24. See Adler, supra note 12, at 297–300. 
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And here are some examples of substantive views: 
 P is better off in O1 than O2 iff O1 is an objective 
improvement for P and this improvement is grounded in 
some hedonic difference between the two outcomes (e.g., 
P is in sufficient pain in O2 that everyone ideally would 
prefer to be P in O1 instead). 
 P is better off in O1 than O2 iff O1 is an objective 
improvement for P and this difference is grounded in some 
“perfectionist” difference between the outcomes, i.e., P is 
better with respect to activities and characteristics essential 
to humans. 
 P is better off in O1 than O2 iff O1 is an objective 
improvement for P. 
 P is better off in O1 than O2 iff O1 is an objective 
improvement for P and P prefers O1. 
The distinction between preferentialist and substantive welfare views 
thus delineated is useful for my purposes here because the latter but not 
the former class of views incorporate an objectivist “screen” that helps 
preclude esoteric features of outcomes from counting as welfare 
improvements.  Ironically, it will turn out, it is not preferentialism—the 
class of views favored by economists—but substantivism that will help 
Kaplow respond to an antiretroactivity argument of the following sort: 
“People prefer that they and others not be treated in ways that they 
believe to be unfair; they believe retroactivity to be unfair; by frustrating 
this preference, the state reduces overall welfare.”  I will discuss the 
problem that esoteric preferences pose for transition policy anon, but 
first let me mention some other ways in which the general utilitarian 
notion of maximizing overall welfare needs to be specified. 
III. WHAT IS OVERALL WELFARE?  INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS AND 
THE PROBLEM OF OUTCOME-INCOMPARABILITY 
Utilitarians owe us an account of interpersonal comparisons.  Here’s 
one, which on most days I tend to think is pretty plausible and which 
builds on Harsanyi’s work: O1 is better for overall welfare than O2 iff (1) 
O1 is a Pareto-improvement
25 over O2 or if not (2) everyone under ideal 
 
 25. I use terms like “Pareto-improvement,” “Pareto-noncomparable” and so on in 
the welfare sense, not the preference sense.  O1 is a Pareto improvement relative to O2, in 
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conditions would prefer a lottery giving her an equal probability of being 
each person in O1, to a lottery giving her an equal probability of being 
each person in O2.
26  Note that this construct for interpersonal 
comparisons leads to incomparability in the welfare ordering of worlds.27  
Economists like to assume a complete ordering over outcomes, i.e., each 
outcome is either better, or worse, or equally good as every other 
outcome.28  But on the modified Harsanyi account just offered some 
outcomes will be incomparable with respect to overall welfare.  And I 
haven’t seen a plausible construct for interpersonal comparisons that 
avoids some incomparabilities. 
Indeed, it may be the case that the scope of incomparability, with 
respect to the overall-welfare ranking of outcomes, is quite wide.  Actual 
rule-drafting choices, in this world, almost always lead to Pareto-
noncomparable outcomes.  That is, for most of the sets of choices with 
respect to general rules that governmental actors have faced and will 
face in the future, it is not the case that the outcome of one choice in the 
choice set is a Pareto-improvement over the outcomes of all the other 
choices.  And it may be the case that the correct account of interpersonal 
comparisons leaves unranked most (if not all) of these Pareto-
noncomparable outcomes that rule-drafters actually confront.  Consider 
my modified Harsanyi construct.  The construct clearly does succeed in 
producing a decisive ranking over pairs of outcomes like the following: 
 In O1, one person suffers a mild, recurring headache. In 
O2, he does not suffer the headache but thousands of other 
people die prematurely. 
 In O1, a few ultrarich have fewer cars and houses than they 
would in O2. In O2, many more people fall below the 
poverty line than in O1. 
But does the construct produce a decisive ranking of pairs of outcomes 
like the following? 
 In O1, the regulator enacts a strict environmental safety 
code.  In O2, he does not.  In O1, many people lose their 
jobs or have much lower incomes, as compared to O2. But 
some premature deaths are avoided, and wilderness areas, 
enjoyed by many, are preserved. 
 
the welfare sense, if someone is better off in O1 and no one is worse off—which doesn’t 
entail anything about anyone’s preferences except on certain (specifically, preferentialist) 
views of welfare. 
 26. See Adler, supra note 12, at 289–300. 
 27. See id. at 300–01. 
 28. See BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 17, at 137–69. 
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 In O1, my Planner enacts a policy of simple retroactivity.  
In O2, my Planner enacts a policy of simple prospectivity. 
In O1, some actors incur retroactive fines that they would 
avoid in O2; but others avoid injuries that they would suffer 
in O2 (given the positive incentive effects of retroactivity). 
I don’t know. 
Assume that the transition-rule choice faced by my Planner or, more 
generally, by some Planner in some other context is a choice between 
transition rules the outcomes of which are incomparable with respect to 
overall welfare.  What does this mean for the choice of rule?  It means, to 
be blunt, that the choice is morally ungoverned, within utilitarianism.29  
The Planner is free to pick either transition rule; the overall-welfare 
criterion does not guide her with respect to that choice; she is free to, 
say, flip a coin, just as she would be free to flip a coin in choosing 
between two outcomes identical for everyone’s welfare.  More precisely, 
transition-rule choices that lead to outcomes that are either incomparable 
or precisely equal with respect to overall welfare are choices that an 
omniscient utilitarian Planner is free to make either way.  An omniscient 
Planner knows, for sure, which outcomes would result from the choices 
available to her.  Choices by epistemically limited Planners pose additional 
complications: the Planner, now, sees each choice as a lottery over 
outcomes, such that some but maybe not all of the possible outcomes in 
each lottery are incomparable with some but maybe not all of the 
possible outcomes in the other lotteries.  I cannot pursue these complications 
here.  I’ll just conjecture that, if the incomparability of resulting outcomes 
leaves the omniscient utilitarian transition Planner free to do whatever 
she wants, then epistemically limited utilitarian Planners will also in 
some cases gain a moral freedom that they would lack were a complete 
welfare ordering over outcomes to obtain. 
In short, given sufficiently wide overall-welfare incomparability as 
between Pareto-noncomparable outcomes, most transition choices actually 
faced by rule-drafters may be a matter of utilitarian indifference. It may 
just not matter, within utilitarianism, which choices these officials make: 
whether they choose grandfathering, full retroactivity, or anything in 
between.  Of course, the wide incomparability that creates this kind of 
moral freedom would also create moral freedom with respect to 
 
 29. See Matthew D. Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1371, 1404–08 (1998). 
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substantive legal choices.  It also wouldn’t matter whether clean air acts are 
enacted, whether workplace safety regimes are put into place, whether 
monopolies are broken up.  The problem of incomparability is a “nuclear 
threat” to the whole field of utilitarian policy analysis—a threat that 
economists (with a few exceptions, like Sen)30 have ignored.  Transition 
policy is hardly uniquely threatened; then again, it is not exempt from 
the threat either. 
IV. HOW SHOULD EPISTEMICALLY LIMITED PLANNERS CHOOSE? 
SPECIFYING THE “EX ANTE” VIEW 
For the remainder of these comments, I’ll ignore the problem of 
incomparability and assume (implausibly!) that the right view of welfare, be 
it preferentialist or substantive, generates a methodology for interpersonal 
comparisons sufficiently powerful to rank all outcomes as better, worse, 
or equally good with respect to overall welfare. 
A different problem cannot be ignored, however, one to which I have 
already alluded.  Transition planners, like other policymakers and agents, 
are not omniscient.  For the omnisicent utilitarian agent, faced with a 
range of possible actions {A1 . . An} at some time T, each action is 
matched with its actual outcome—the actual world that would result, 
were the action to be chosen—and the agent simply chooses that action 
with the best outcome.  For imperfect (nonomniscient) agents, matters 
are not so simple.  Imperfect agents fall into two types.  Some agents are 
epistemically limited but computationally perfect. Others are both 
epistemically and computationally imperfect.  Herbert Simon’s work on 
“bounded rationality” focused on the latter type.31  Standard theorizing 
in economics assumes the former type.32  The expected-utility maximizer is 
an agent who does not know the actual outcomes of his choices (he lacks 
full empirical information, or in other words gaining that information is 
costly), but has unlimited ability to represent possible outcomes and 
choices to himself and to determine all the logical entailments, with 
respect to those choices and outcomes, of whatever rationality axioms 
we might posit. 
 
 30. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 203–21 
(1982); Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL 
ECONOMICS 1073, 1127–28 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds., 1986). 
 31. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (3 vols. 1982-
1997). 
 32. See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 71–131 
(1990) (presenting expected-utility model of choice). 
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I, too, will ignore the problem of computational limits and assume that 
my Planner is epistemically but not computationally limited. What 
should she do?  First, are there probability numbers linking each choice 
with the possible outcomes of that choice?  I’ll assume there are.33  
Second, are the numbers relevant to her choice subjective probabilities 
(numbers that represent the partial beliefs of some person(s), her own 
beliefs and/or others’) or objective probabilities?34  Finally, if it is subjective 
not objective probabilities that bear upon the Planner’s choice, do her 
own subjective probabilities take priority in some way?35 
I believe that subjective, not objective probabilities are relevant to the 
Planner’s choice.  In other words, she should maximize subjective expected 
overall welfare.  Each action Ai facing her, from {A1 . . An}, amounts (in 
her view) to a lottery over the possible outcomes {O1 . . . Om}. To each 
outcome included in the {O1 . . . Om} lottery, she attaches a subjective 
probability number representing her partial belief that Ai, if chosen, 
would result in that outcome.  Each outcome also has attached a cardinal 
welfare number representing the overall welfare in that outcome.  (For 
simplicity, assume that the Planner knows with certainty what that 
number is.)  Using these welfare numbers, plus the subjective probability 
numbers just described, the Planner can calculate the subjective expected 
overall welfare of each action and then, from {A1 . . An}, choose the 
action whose subjective expected overall welfare is greatest. The 
objectivist36 stipulates, instead, that the probabilities used to calculate 
expected overall welfare are objective—where the standard proposal for 
achieving objectivity, here, is to construe probabilities as relative 
frequencies rather than degrees of belief.37  That proposal is problematic, 
 
 33. Some accounts of choice under uncertainty are nonprobabilistic—most famously 
the “maximin” account.  See SIMON FRENCH, DECISION THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
MATHEMATICS OF RATIONALITY 36 (1986). 
 34. See KREPS, supra note 32, at 71–131 (presenting both objective-probability 
and subjective-probability variants of expected-utility account). 
 35. On this issue, see Philippe Mongin & Claude d’Aspremont, Utility Theory and 
Ethics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF UTILITY THEORY 371, 437–44 (Salvador Barbera et al. eds., 1998). 
 36. The subjectivism/objectivism issue, here, involves the nature of probability 
and is orthogonal to the substantivism/preferentialism issue discussed above—which 
concerns the nature of welfare. 
 37. On the nature of objective and subjective probabilities, see L. JONATHAN 
COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION AND PROBABILITY (1989); 
DONALD GILLIES, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF PROBABILITY (2000); HENRY E. KYBURG, 
JR., PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC (1970); ROY WEATHERFORD, PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY THEORY (1982). 
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I think, for reasons I can only mention here.  First, the probabilities 
relevant to expected utility maximization must be capable of linking 
actions and highly specified, nonrepeatable outcomes (whole worlds, 
which include the occurrence of various events at various particular 
times, or to particular people), but relative frequencies—which look to 
how frequently various outcomes occur in indefinitely repeated 
experiments—can at most link actions and repeatable outcomes.  Second, 
the whole point of the expected-utility idea is to define a decision-
procedure that is sensitive to the situation of an epistemically limited 
agent. We might talk about what the agent ought to do in an external 
sense, or what she reasonably does given her internal states (specifically, 
her limited knowledge). “Externally,” she should choose the action with 
the best outcome; internally, if computationally unlimited, she maximizes 
subjective expected overall welfare (where, in turn, the maximizing 
choice at a particular time might be to acquire more information).38 
Turn, now, to the problem of the relative priority of the utilitarian 
Planner’s probabilistic beliefs versus the probabilistic beliefs of others.  
At a given point in time T, the epistemically limited but computationally 
unlimited Planner faces a set of possible actions {A1 . . . An}, a set of 
possible outcomes {O1 . . Om} and her own subjective probabilities at 
that time linking each action and each outcome.  Those probability 
numbers need not be the same as the subjective probability numbers that 
individual Citizens ascribe to the action-outcome pairs.  What should the 
Planner do in the case of such deviation?  Here’s an extreme example: 
(1) some action A+ maximizes expected overall welfare, given the 
Planner’s subjective probabilities, but (2) some other action A* is “ex 
ante efficient,” in the sense that each Citizen (using his own subjective 
probabilities and focusing on his own welfare) calculates that the 
expected goodness for him of A* is greater than the expected goodness 
of A+  and all other choices in {A1 . . . An}
 . 
My appeal to the epistemic situation of the Planner answers this 
question: the Planner should maximize subjective expected overall welfare 
given her own subjective probabilities, even if some other choice is ex 
ante efficient based on Citizen beliefs, and more generally regardless of 
what the Citizens believe.39 To be sure, the Planner’s own beliefs are 
 
 38. It should be noted that the subjectivist about probability and expected welfare 
does impose epistemic rationality constraints on subjective probabilities.  At a minimum, 
they must satisfy the probability calculus.  Further, probabilities must be dynamically 
updated in a rational way; the individual is not free at any time to adopt a new set of 
absolute and conditional probabilities satisfying the calculus but wholly unrelated to his 
earlier set. Yet further constraints may obtain. 
 39. See Matthew D. Adler, The Puzzle of “Ex Ante Efficiency”: Does Rational 
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potentially sensitive to Citizen beliefs; for example, if she believes a 
Citizen to be expert in some domain, then (ceteris paribus) the Planner 
will revise her prior beliefs to match the Citizen’s.  This can be captured 
in a standard, Bayesian model of dynamic subjective probability revision40: 
over time, the Planner learns facts that cause her to modify her beliefs, 
including facts about others’ beliefs.  But the beliefs that determine, at 
any particular time, what an epistemically limited utilitarian Planner 
should do are just hers; it is those beliefs, not the Citizens’, that link 
together with the overall-welfare ranking of outcomes to determine what 
she “ought” (in an internal sense) to do. 
V. SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED WELFARE MAXIMIZATION AND INCENTIVES 
We are now in a position to talk, a little more concretely, about the 
Planner’s choice at T0 between a transition rule of prospectivity (any 
changes in regulatory directives in the domain will be applied prospectively) 
and retroactivity (any changes will be applied retroactively, both to 
sanction actions previously permissible but now impermissible, and to 
refund sanctions on actions now permissible but earlier impermissible).  If 
the Planner maximizes subjective expected overall welfare, which transition 
rule ought she to choose? 
Here’s one way to think about the question.  At T0, a particular set of 
substantive rules for the regulatory domain is in place (call this set R0).  
The Planner anticipates that, at some later time T1, she may modify the 
substantive rules, in light of events between T0 and T1.  By events, I 
mean changes in the population, in physical characteristics of Citizens, 
in their physical location, in their social structure, changes in the 
external world, new information about physical or social facts, and so 
on, which are relevant to the Planner and relatively epistemically 
accessible to the Planner—anything that might occur, thereby change the 
Planner’s beliefs about the upshots of various possible directives, and 
thus prompt her to modify the substantive set of rules R0.  For simplicity, 
assume that, when a relevant event occurs, the Planner learns that for 
sure.41  This allows us to conceptualize the changes in the Planner’s 
 
Approvability have Moral Weight?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1255 (2003). 
 40. See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY 
AND INFORMATION 167–208 (1992); KYBURG, supra note 37, at 68–76; RICHARD C. 
JEFFREY, THE LOGIC OF DECISION 164–83 (2nd ed. 1983). 
 41. This is too simple, of course, but the problem I’m about to delineate would 
also surely arise under a more complex model. 
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beliefs, and resultant changes in the substantive rules, as a simple 
process of Bayesian updating.42  At T0, the Planner has “prior” (absolute) 
probabilities for all manner of propositions, and conditional probabilities 
for all manner of propositions, conditional on various events that might 
occur between T0 and T1.  Between T0 and T1, some concatenation of 
events occurs; the Planner learns that, and updates her “prior” probabilities 
using the conditional probabilities she had at T0.  This results in a new, 
“posterior” set of probability ascriptions at T1.  The Planner at T1 then 
chooses the new rule, R1
P, that maximizes subjective expected overall 
welfare given her new, “posterior” probabilities. 
This picture of event-occurrence and belief-change between T0 and T1 
feeds back into the Planner’s choice of transition rule at T0.  The Planner 
at T0 (who after all is computationally unlimited) can represent to herself 
all possible concatenations of events that might occur between T0 and T1, 
and to which she would have epistemic access.  For each concatenation, 
the Planner at T0 can calculate: (1) the rule R1
P she would enact at T1; (2) 
the optimal pattern of behaviors between T0 and T1; (3) the various 
behavioral patterns that might occur if the Planner adopts a transition 
rule of simple prospectivity; (4) the various behavioral patterns that 
might occur if the Planner adopts a transition rule of simple retroactivity.  
For each concatenation, in short, there is an expected cost to a transition 
rule of prospectivity (the behavioral deviation under that rule from the 
optimal pattern), but also an expected cost to a transition rule of 
retroactivity (the behavioral deviation under that rule from the optimal 
pattern).  Aggregating probabilistically over concatenations, using her 
probabilities at T0, the Planner chooses the transition rule that maximizes 
subjective expected overall welfare. 
What this picture suggests is that the Planner, at the time she chooses 
the transition rule, might expect there to be “incentive costs”—deviations 
from the optimal (by her lights) pattern of citizen behaviors—under both 
retroactivity and prospectivity regimes.  Note that this can occur even if, 
for a given concatenation of events, the optimal pattern of behaviors in 
the preamendment period43 involves full compliance with the new 
substantive rule R1
P that the Planner expects to enact (given that 
concatenation) at the end of period, at T1.  Why?  Assume the transition 
rule is a retroactivity rule.  Then, for a given concatenation of events 
during the preamendment period, each individual Citizen will try to 
predict what the new rule R1
P will be, and will try to comply with that 
rule.44  But these predictions might be incorrect.  More precisely: for 
 
 42. See sources cited supra note 40. 
 43. By this I mean the period after T0 and prior to T1. 
 44. This again is a simplifying assumption.  Whether a given Citizen will try to 
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each possible concatenation of events that might arise during the 
preamendment period, the Planner at T0 has beliefs about (1) what rule 
she would enact at T1  (R1
P
), and (2) what any given Citizen would predict 
R1
P to be (R1
C).  Nothing requires that these hypothesized rules coincide.  
The Planner might well believe that a given concatenation will lead her 
to maximize subjective expected overall welfare down the road by 
enacting R*, but also believe that this concatenation will lead various 
Citizens to predict that she will maximize subjective expected overall 
welfare down the road by enacting R+ (and therefore that those Citizens, 
in a retroactivity regime, will try to comply with R+).  This deviation 
between the rule the Planner expects to enact in a given scenario, and the 
rule she expects to be expected to enact, might (among other things) lead 
the Planner to conclude that prospectivity provides better incentives than 
retroactivity. 
Perhaps a yet more concrete example would help.  The Planner 
regulates foods and drugs, by keeping a list of prohibited products and 
attaching civil fines to the use or distribution of these products.  For any 
given product, she determines whether it would maximize subjective 
expected overall welfare to prohibit or permit the product, roughly by 
balancing the expected health and/or hedonic benefits to the population 
of Citizens who would use the product if permitted, against the expected 
health and/or hedonic costs.  At T0, she enacts the initial list L0.  For a 
given possible concatenation of subsequent events (changes in the 
population, new information about the health effects of various products, 
etc.), the Planner expects to change the list to L1
P at T1.  If she puts in 
place a prospectivity rule at T0, then (she predicts) firms will continue to 
 
comply with his prediction of R1
P during the preamendment period, assuming a 
transition rule of retroactivity, depends upon the probabilities that his violation will be 
detected and that R1
P will be retroactively enforced in his case, the predicted sanction if 
that occurs, and the expected benefit of noncompliance.  For simplicity, I’m assuming 
that the probabilities of detection and enforcement—the Citizen’s subjective 
probabilities—and the size of the sanction are large enough to induce compliance in all 
cases.  Indeed, talk of a single R1
P that each Citizen predicts the Planner to adopt is 
oversimplified; really, if the Citizens are fully rational, each has a conditional subjective 
probability distribution over possible rules the Planner might adopt, conditional on each 
possible concatenation of events during the preamendment period, and maximizes his 
expected utility given this distribution plus his probability distributions over detection, 
enforcement, and the stringency of the sanction as well as the benefits of noncompliance. 
My general point—that the Planner might predict deviations from the optimal pattern of 
behaviors to occur under both sorts of transition regimes—in no way hinges on these 
simplifying assumptions. 
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sell and consumers will continue to use products permissible under L0 
but not L1
P during the preamendment period, and firms will decline to 
sell and consumers will decline to use products impermissible under L0 
but permissible under L1
P.  That will be costly, by her lights.  On the 
other hand, if she puts in place a retroactivity rule and the particular 
concatenation of events under consideration occurs, then (she envisions) 
(1) a given Citizen, using his own probabilities, will determine that the 
expected-overall-welfare-maximizing list is L1
C; (2) the Citizen will 
predict that the Planner will change the list to L1
C;45 (3) expecting 
retroactivity, the Citizen will comply with L1
C,which may differ from 
L1
P. That, too, may be costly.  The expected cost will depend on the 
predicted deviation between the list the Planner would adopt, L1
P and the 
list she expects the Citizen to predict her to adopt, L1
C. 
This deviation might readily arise if the Citizen is an irrational 
consumer—if he doesn’t process information in a rational way (at a 
minimum, in conformity with the probability calculus).  The very 
predicate for governmental regulation of foods, drugs, and other such 
products is that consumers, in part because of epistemic irrationality, fail 
to reach judgments that (by the government’s lights) maximize their own 
welfare. A fortiori, irrational consumers might fail to reach judgments 
about the maximization of overall welfare that match the Planner’s 
judgments.  But the problem I’m trying to describe is much broader than 
that of irrationality.  Rational Citizens might disagree about the welfare-
maximizing response to different events.  (Formally, this arises because 
their priors are different.)46  Perhaps this is not a possibility where the 
 
 45. To make this concrete story most tractable, I have assumed that (the Planner 
believes that) the Citizen’s first-order beliefs about what list maximizes welfare for a 
given concatenation, and the Citizen’s second-order beliefs about what list the Planner 
believes maximizes welfare for a given concatenation, are the same.  Note that the two 
need not be the same.  In other words, the Citizen might believe the Planner to have 
different views about welfare-maximization than his own—for example, because of the 
difference between their political party affiliations.  In general, it is the Planner’s beliefs 
about each Citizen’s second-order beliefs, not about each Citizen’s first-order beliefs, 
that are relevant to the Planner’s prediction of citizen behavior during the preamendment 
period and, therewith, her choice of transition policy. 
 46. It should be stressed that the subjectivist model of probability allows 
individuals to have radically different probability assignments, and generally entails 
convergence only on the assumption that individuals are presented with large amounts of 
identical information sufficient to “overwhelm” divergent priors.  See ROGER M. COOKE, 
EXPERTS IN UNCERTAINTY: OPINION AND SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY IN SCIENCE 110–12 
(1991); MICHAEL D. RESNIK, CHOICES: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION THEORY 55–56 
(1987). Stronger assumptions about convergence are standard within various branches of 
economics.  For example, game theorists commonly abide by the so-called “Harsanyi 
doctrine”: “All players begin the game with the same beliefs about the probabilities of 
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relevant probabilities are objective, but it certainly is a possibility where 
the relevant probabilities are subjective.  At T0, the Planner and each 
rational Citizen has prior subjective probabilities, quite possibly different in 
important respects, over various propositions.  Events occur during the 
preamendment period, and based on these, plus their priors, the Planner 
and each Citizen determine what the welfare-maximizing amendment to 
the rule would be.  There might be quite a range, here—a range evidenced 
by the heated policy debates on all manner of issues among researchers, 
policy analysts, and others whose disagreements persist despite a shared 
consequentialism and welfarism.  Therefore—and this is the crucial point 
for my purposes—there might also be a substantial difference at the initial 
stage of transition-rule choice (T0) between what the Planner expects to 
enact in response to certain events, and what the Planner predicts various 
rational Citizens to expect her to enact in response to those events.  And 
that can cut against the enactment of a retroactivity rule.47 
 
the moves Nature will make.”  ERIC RASMUSEN,  GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 50 (2nd ed. 1994).  And the “rational expectations” 
approach in economics, which figures importantly within Shaviro’s treatment of 
transition policy, traditionally presupposes the following: “Agents’ subjective probability 
distributions coincide with the objective probability distribution of events.”  DEBORAH A. 
REDMAN, A READER’S GUIDE TO RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS: A SURVEY AND COMPREHENSIVE 
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 8 (1992). Such assumptions, however useful for the 
tractability of formal models, should not blind us to the possibility of divergent priors 
and the implications of that possibility for our policy choices, for example our choice of 
transition policy.  See Mongin & d’Aspremont, supra note 35, at 440 n.95 (“For 
modeling purposes, economists often assume that prior probabilities are equal.  It is 
important to realize that this ‘common prior assumption’ is introduced for 
methodological reasons and does not have any choice-theoretic foundation.”). 
 47. In this particular case, I have assumed, the Planner believes there to be an 
identity between the Citizen’s first-order beliefs about welfare-maximization and the 
Citizen’s second-order beliefs about the Planner’s beliefs about welfare-maximization.  
See supra note 45.  Therefore what drives the deviation between the rule that the Planner 
expects to enact, and the rule the Planner expects to be expected to enact, is the first-
order disagreement about welfare maximization.  It might be argued that, once the 
identity assumption is relaxed, the problem I have described disappears—since first-
order disagreement about welfare-maximization is, in principle, consistent with second-
order convergence about what the Planner believes to maximize welfare.  (In a society 
split into many ideological factions, everyone might know exactly what the ideology of 
the longstanding monarch is.)  But one cannot insist on second-order convergence a 
priori. The Planner might have been recently appointed, or have made no effort to 
publicize her views, or have done so but without success given citizen apathy, or have 
done so but without success given her affiliation with a party that (like every other party 
in the relevant society) has tried to mimic the views of the median voter, or . . . . 
  
 
22 
To sum up: on a subjective expected welfare view, the utilitarian 
Planner’s choice of transition rule is dependent, in a complicated way, 
on her higher-order as well as first-order beliefs: specifically, as I have 
presented things, on her third-order beliefs as to what Citizens would 
believe that she would believe to be welfare-maximizing, which need 
not coincide with her first-order beliefs about welfare-maximization.  On 
this view of things, it seems hard to make general statements about the 
desirability, qua incentives, of retroactivity versus prospectivity.  It bears 
emphasizing that the problem I’m describing is orthogonal to the policy 
change/accounting change distinction (as I understand it).48  Contemplating 
some possible concatenation of events during the preamendment period, 
and some new rule R1
P that she would adopt in response to those events, 
the Planner might believe that anticipatory preamendment compliance 
with R1
P would be better than continued preamendment compliance with 
R0. R1
P, then, would be a policy change and not a mere accounting 
change. But the Planner might also believe that a retroactivity rule would 
induce preamendment compliance by a given Citizen with R1
C not R1
P 
(where R1
C is the new rule that, the Planner believes, the Citizen expects 
the events to induce the Planner to adopt).  If the Planner believes this 
sort of deviation to be sufficiently large and widespread, she might 
decide that prospectivity not retroactivity is the welfare-maximizing 
option even in the case of a true policy change. 
VI. SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED WELFARE MAXIMIZATION AND INSURANCE 
One of the interesting features of the subjective expected welfare view 
is its agnosticism about the benefits of markets and other choice-
facilitating mechanisms—even on a preferentialist view of welfare.  For 
any given choice by a Citizen, there is a potential wedge between the 
goodness of that choice from the Citizen’s perspective and the goodness 
from the Planner’s perspective created by the potential difference in their 
subjective probability assessments.  If there’s a product that the Citizen 
believes has a high probability of satisfying his preference for a certain 
taste sensation, and a low probability of frustrating his preference for 
bodily integrity, the Citizen rationally consumes it.  If the Planner ascribes 
a sufficiently lower probability to the outcome in which the food 
produces the desired taste sensation, or a sufficiently higher probability 
to the outcome in which the food kills or injures the Citizen, then 
(bracketing the welfare of other persons, or a Citizen preference for 
autonomy), the Planner maximizes subjective expected overall welfare 
 
 48. See SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 53–63. 
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by banning the Citizen from buying the product.49 
This agnosticism about markets and individual choice carries over to 
insurance markets. In some possible outcome, the Citizen’s wealth position 
is low (say, because he has been fined a large amount for a legal infraction).  
If the Citizen is rational and risk-averse and self-interested, and if he 
ascribes a sufficiently high probability to the outcome, then he will contract 
with a risk-neutral insurance firm to insure against the outcome even though 
there is some administrative cost to the contract which he and/or the firm 
bear.  If there are no externalities, then this contract is ex ante efficient relative 
to the choice of not contracting.  But—from the Planner’s perspective—the 
contracting choice might not maximize subjective expected overall welfare.  
If the Planner ascribes a lower probability to the insured-against outcome 
than the Citizen, and if the administrative costs of the insurance contract are 
large enough, then (from the Planner’s perspective) the expected overall 
welfare benefit of the contract will not justify the expected overall welfare 
cost.  Reciprocally, it might be ex ante efficient for a citizen to decline to 
insure against (what he takes to be) a low-probability outcome, but overall-
welfare-maximizing from the Planner’s perspective for the insurance to be 
provided. 
The upshot: there is no a priori reason for the Planner to be sanguine 
about the insurance transactions that a retroactivity rule would trigger.50  
Imagine that the Planner is choosing between three variants of the 
retroactivity rule: (1) retroactivity with no provision governing insurance; 
(2) retroactivity with a prohibition on any insurance to cover retroactive 
civil sanctions; (3) retroactivity with mandatory (partial) government 
insurance to cover retroactive civil sanctions.  Insofar as the Planner expects 
Citizens to overestimate or underestimate (by the Planner’s own lights) the 
possibility of various rule changes, she will have reason to choose the 
second or third rule, or something like these, rather than the first. 
 
 49. See Adler, supra note 39, at 1276–79. 
 50. Kaplow states that “[p]erhaps the strongest case for some government response 
to risk is presented by situations in which certain actors underestimate the likelihood of 
loss and thus refuse to purchase insurance when it is in their interest to do so.”  Kaplow, 
supra note 1, at 549.  This suggests an objectivist account of risk and epistemically 
irrational or limited agents whose estimates of the objective risk are mistaken.  By 
contrast, my picture is one of (possibly) fully rational agents—the Planner and 
Citizens—whose subjective probability assessments diverge as these may do, such that 
insurance market transactions which are welfare maximizing from some agents’ 
perspectives are not welfare maximizing from others’. 
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VII.  THE (POTENTIAL) WELFARE RELEVANCE OF ESOTERIC FACTS 
The Planner is choosing at T0 between various transition rules, in my 
example simple retroactivity and simple prospectivity.  Which choice 
maximizes the Planner’s subjective expected overall welfare depends on 
two things: (1) her probability distribution over possible outcomes, 
conditional on each choice; and (2) her valuation of the outcomes, i.e., 
the level of overall welfare in each outcome.  In my discussion of incentives 
and insurance, I focused on the first determinant of the Planner’s choice.  
But we also need to look at the second.  Imagine a universe in which 
only certain hedonic states are intrinsic constituents of welfare—absent 
differences in these states, outcomes are identical for overall welfare. 
Imagine, now, a universe in which a much wider range of things can 
change the welfare status of outcomes: interpersonal relationships, 
accomplishments, mental states that are not hedonically charged, 
deviations from personal or social norms, and so forth. It would be 
extraordinary if retroactivity rules were appropriate in just the same legal 
contexts, in the first universe, as in the second. 
A simple preferentialist view of welfare remains standard among 
economists.51  This view says: O1 is better for P than O2 iff P prefers O1 to 
O2 (with further provisos for cases where P’s preferences vary temporally 
or modally).  But P can prefer anything.  A preference is a kind of “pro-
attitude”: a choice-relevant mental state directed onto some proposition or 
fact.  There is nothing, in the sheer concept of a preference, to restrict the 
kinds of facts onto which preferences are directed.52  In short, the simple 
preference-based view of welfare permits the widest possible range of 
things to count as intrinsic welfare constituents. 
This is a real threat to the utilitarian case for retroactivity.  The 
following sorts of facts are inevitable upshots of the Planner’s choice of 
the retroactivity rule or, if not, she will presumably ascribe these sorts of 
facts a higher probability than if the prospectivity rule is chosen. If the 
facts are intrinsically dispreferred, by one or more Citizens, then (on the 
simple preferentialist view) this reduces the expected overall welfare 
benefit of choosing retroactivity. 
Dispreferrable Esoteric Consequences of Retroactivity 
 Retroactive sanctions (potentially dispreferred as a kind of 
treatment that the Citizen believes to be unfair; note that 
 
 51. See DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 71–83 (1996). 
 52. See Adler, supra note 12, at 262–64. 
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the Citizen might prefer not just that he not be treated this 
way, but that others too not be treated this way). 
 “Horizontal inequity” (the difference in treatment between 
those who complied with the old rule but were sanctioned 
retroactively for breaching the eventual new rule, and those 
who complied with both rules, potentially dispreferred 
insofar as the Citizen believes this difference to be 
inequitable). 
 Being at risk of a retroactive sanction (What I have in 
mind, here, is not the ordinary way in which the subjective 
probability of a retroactive sanction influences the choices  
of a rational Citizen who disprefers an outcome in which 
he is sanctioned, but rather the more unusual case of a 
preference against the risk of a sanction taken as a feature 
of outcomes—a ceteris paribus preference on the Citizen’s 
part against a possible world in which there is a high 
probability, at some time, that he will be retroactively 
sanctioned later on).53 
 Anxiety about future retroactive sanctions (the negative 
affective states that occur in some Citizens worried about 
whether their now-legal conduct will be retroactively 
sanctioned). 
 Ex post demoralization (the frustration and anger that 
occur in some Citizens after their conduct is sanctioned 
retroactively). 
 Ex post outrage (the frustration and anger that occur in 
some Citizens after others are sanctioned retroactively, 
which the Citizens perceive to be unfair or inequitable). 
Within a simple-preferentialist view of welfare (1) the existence of 
preferences over these sorts of facts is a contingent matter (nothing in 
principle precludes their existence) and (2) the strength of preferences 
over these sorts of facts is a contingent matter (nothing in principle 
precludes preferences against perceived unfair treatment, perceived 
 
 53. Persons can intrinsically disprefer the risk of adverse occurrences—disprefer 
that risk, taken as a feature of outcomes—just as they can intrinsically disprefer such 
occurrences themselves.  Consider an ordinary Joe who prefers that he not die, also 
prefers that he not fear death, and finally prefers that he not be the victim of a game of 
Russian Roulette (even a game that doesn’t kill him and that causes him no fear because 
he’s unaware of it).  See Adler, supra note 14, at 1351–52. 
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horizontal inequity, the risk of being sanctioned, and so on from being 
very strong). And indeed it seems empirically plausible that people do 
have fairly strong intrinsic preferences against retroactivity insofar as 
they believe it to be unfair or inequitable. 
To put the point another way: the nonconsequentialist or nonwelfarist 
moral arguments against retroactivity that the welfarist counts as 
misplaced can reenter the picture in the guise of morally grounded 
preferences against retroactivity.  And at this point the welfarist who is 
also a simple preferentialist about welfare must give ground.  Simple 
preferentialism, because of its catholicism about welfare, requires the 
transition Planner to include these preferences as well as preferences 
against sanction risk, anxiety, demoralization, outrage and other esoteric 
consequences of retroactivity in the welfare calculus.54 
What about substantive welfare theories?  Look first at the following 
exemplary lists of substantive values proposed by leading welfare 
theorists: 
Griffin: Accomplishment, autonomy, understanding, enjoyment, 
deep personal relations.55 
Finnis: Life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, 
practical reasonableness, religion.56 
Parfit: Moral goodness, rational activity, the development of one’s 
abilities, having children and being a good parent, knowledge, the 
awareness of true beauty.57 
Nussbaum: Life, bodily health, bodily integrity, use of the senses, 
imagination and thought, the emotions, practical reason, affiliation, 
interaction with other species, play, control over one’s environment.58 
Even under Nussbaum’s quite expansive list, it’s hard to see how 
perceived unfairness or inequity, in the third-person or even first-person 
sense—the treatment of others in a way that the Citizen takes to be 
unfair or inequitable, or his own treatment in a way that he takes to be 
unfair or inequitable—counts as a welfare setback.  If this treatment 
gives rise to certain emotional states, e.g., demoralization or outrage, 
then by virtue of Nussbaum’s list (and Griffin’s, if not Parfit’s or 
 
 54. Kaplow would, I take it, happily concede this point about the welfare relevance 
of morally motivated preferences, which is discussed at length in a different context in his 
work with Shavell. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 11, at 21–23, 77–78, 431–36. 
 55. JAMES GRIFFIN, VALUE JUDGEMENT: IMPROVING OUR ETHICAL BELIEFS 29–30 
(1996). 
 56. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59–99 (1980). 
 57. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 499 (1984). 
 58. Symposium on Martha Nussbaum’s Political Philosophy, 111 ETHICS 5 (2000). 
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Finnis’) it will be welfare-reducing.  But morally dispreferred treatments 
are not, without more, substantive welfare setbacks. At most one might 
say that certain kinds of governmental actions, if generally thought to be 
morally wrong, might—even absent attendant emotional states—reduce 
the strength of the political “community” and thereby harm affiliational 
goods.  But this would presumably require the relevant beliefs to be fairly 
widespread.  As for the putative harm in risk itself: I have argued at 
length elsewhere that risk is not a substantive harm, in the sense of being 
a welfare-reducing feature of outcomes.59  Risk is, of course, relevant to 
any actor’s choice, within an expected-utility account of choice; but 
given two worlds differentiated by the fact that in one some Citizen is at 
risk of sanction or an even graver setback such as serious bodily injury 
or death, while in another he does not face that risk, the two worlds are 
(without more) substantively just the same for the Citizen’s welfare. 
Is the welfare economist, then, put to the choice of either abandoning 
the preferentialism so central to economics, or conceding that the case 
for retroactivity within any legal domain is wholly contingent on the 
preferences against the esoteric consequences of retroactivity not being 
too strong?  In other words, can some of the esoteric consequences of 
retroactivity be drained of welfare force within the preferentialist family 
of theories?  Perhaps.  One might try to appeal to full information60: no 
one, under full information, would care about living in a world where 
(with less information) she believes unfair treatment or inequity to 
occur.  This seems like a strong claim.  I do find plausible (and indeed 
implicitly said as much above) that some idealized agents would not 
disprefer being a person who perceives unfairness or inequity to occur in 
the world, with respect to others or herself, absent attendant emotional 
states on that person’s part.61  But the stronger claim that no idealized 
agent could have such a preference may be too strong.  Ditto for the 
claim that no idealized agent would disprefer being at risk, absent 
 
 59. See Adler, supra note 14.  My argument, specifically, is that (1) risk in the 
objective or relative-frequency sense is not a substantive welfare setback; and that (2) 
risk in the subjective sense is a substantive welfare setback as a component of fear, and 
perhaps as a kind of ignorance (where someone ascribes a high subjective probability to 
some occurrence that will not, in fact, take place), but not otherwise. 
 60. See, e.g., David Sobel, Full Information Accounts of Well-Being, 104 ETHICS 
784 (1994). 
 61. I implicitly said this by claiming that perceived unfairness or inequity is not an  
objective welfare setback absent attendant emotional states, since welfare objectivity in 
turn (I suggested earlier) involves a convergence in the preferences of idealized agents. 
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attendant emotional states. What about appealing to self-interest?  This 
might do a lot: insofar as the Citizen prefers that inequity or unfairness 
not occur to others, this seems to be an other-regarding rather than self-
regarding preference.  The trouble, though, is providing an account of a 
“self-interested” preference that does not end up making the theory 
substantive.  No one has yet done that in a coherent and plausible way.62 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
To conclude these remarks: Welfarist analysis of transition policy is, 
most plausibly, utilitarian analysis.  The utilitarian analyst needs to 
worry about some issues not fully mooted within the economics 
literature on transitions.  Incomparability, here as elsewhere, is a threat 
to the practical significance of overall welfare.  Where there are both 
welfare losers and welfare gainers from the choice of transition policy, 
as there always are, it may often not matter (qua overall welfare) which 
choice is made.  Bracketing this point, the analyst needs to worry about 
the complication that preferences regarding the esoteric consequences of 
a retroactivity policy pose for the analysis.  This issue is most readily 
handled by invoking a substantive not preferentialist account of welfare.  
But even on a substantive view the case for retroactivity seems quite 
contingent.  That case hinges, crucially, on the incentive effects on future 
behavior of a previously announced policy of retroactivity.  The problem, 
here, is that what a governmental official believes to be a desirable rule 
change (on some contingency) and what she believes others will believe 
her to see as a desirable rule change (on that contingency) can diverge.  
This is true, presumably, across all areas of law, and regardless of 
whether accurate anticipatory adjustment to the desirable new rule would 
be desirable.  In other words, the now-standard incentive argument for 
retroactivity is less robust than its proponents suggest. The argument 
presupposes that citizens and governmental officials have sufficiently 
convergent beliefs about what officials would do in alternative possible 
futures, and such convergence is empirically contingent even if all the 
citizens and officials are fully rational. 
 
 62. See David Sobel, Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration, 14 ECON. 
& PHIL. 249, 266–69 (1998). 
